Trust-mode floors
Per-tool minimums for who may call what — the minimum caller attestation and the allowed delegation modes per registered tool operation, authored by security admins and enforced by the platform's policy decision point.
Governance → Policies → Trust-mode floors is the security team's authoring surface for delegation floors: per tool operation, the minimum attestation a caller must present and the delegation modes it is allowed to use. It is the authoring counterpart to the read-only Agent Identity portfolio, and it is available to org admins and security admins.
What a floor means
A floor is enforced by the platform's policy decision point as a ceiling control on top of any compliance rules: a call that reaches the tool must meet the minimum attestation and use one of the allowed delegation modes, or it is refused regardless of what the compliance rules would say. A floor has two independent parts, either of which may be left unset:
- Minimum attestation — how strongly the calling workload's identity must
be proven:
asserted(credential only),attested:placement(service-account token — which pod), orattested:workload(workload attestation plus image digest — which build). See attestation levels. - Allowed delegation modes — under which authority the call may run:
chained,connected_account:user,connected_account:workspace,mandate,agent_own, ornone. For example, allowing onlyconnected_account:useron a mailbox tool means every call must run as a connected human user — never as the agent's own service identity.
Floors only bite where a workload-identity mode is live on the platform: a
fleet whose identities are all asserted cannot satisfy an attested:* floor
until per-agent identities are provisioned. Turning identity provisioning and
enforcement on is an explicit platform configuration step — the
enforcement badges on the
Agent Identity page show the current mode, and the platform records would-deny
decisions before enforcement is switched on so you can author floors safely in
advance.
Registry-backed authoring
Floors are keyed per tool operation (<server>__<operation>), exactly like
compliance rules — and you never type a key by hand. The editor is backed by
the Tool Registry: it lists every governable
registered server (MCP servers and APIs) with its operations, so a floor is
always authored against a real, admitted operation. A typo'd key would author
a floor that never matches anything, which is why free-text entry doesn't
exist.
Each server renders as a collapsible card showing its type, its operations
(each tagged with its side-effect class — read-only, mutating, or
destructive), and a floored count. Servers that already carry floors start
expanded.
Editing floors
The screen follows the console's edit convention: read-only until you click Edit floors, then Save floors or Cancel.
In edit mode you author in bulk:
- Select operations — tick individual operations, or tick a server's checkbox to select every operation it exposes at once.
- Set the draft floor — pick a minimum attestation and toggle the allowed delegation modes in the bulk-apply bar.
- Apply floor to selected — stamps the draft onto everything selected in one action. "Clear floors on selected" removes floors the same way, and each floored operation also has an inline clear.
Saving requires a justification, recorded in the policy change log like any other org-policy edit. The platform validates every floor on save (and rejects unknown attestation levels or modes), and enforces the authoring permission on every write — the console gate is a convenience, not the security boundary.
Floors on tools no longer in the registry
If a floor exists for an operation that isn't in the current registry (the tool was removed, or the floor was authored elsewhere), the editor surfaces it in a separate orphaned floors list instead of hiding it. Orphaned floors stay in effect; clear any that no longer apply.
Compliance and tool-call decisions
Value-level governance of tool calls — compliance rules that allow, defer for approval, or deny each call over its actual argument values, with an org baseline and per-agent tightening.
Tool Registry
The org's admitted catalog of tools agents may depend on — registering command-line tools, MCP servers, and APIs from an OpenAPI spec, and how registered operations feed skills and compliance rules.